William Vollmann begins the third chapter of Rising Up, Rising Down, “Where Do My Rights End?,” by outlining four essential choices that individuals have a right to make in determining whether violence is justified:
“1. Whether or not to violently defend itself against violence;2. Whether or not to violently defend someone else from violence;3. Whether or not to destroy itself;4. Whether or not to help a weaker self destroy itself, to save it from a worse fate.”
In fact, he holds the belief that these are “the self’s only rights” (I, p197-198, Citation 8). All of these decisions, however, are contingent on the condition that the decision maker has no allegiance to authority, such that an individual might be compelled to remove themself from “the line of fire.” This is consistent with Vollmann’s perspective that individuals are placed in a unique situation in that the government has the unique legal authority, and sometimes obligation, to wage violence in certain circumstances. This chapter, along with the entirety of the book, seeks to clarify questions about the morality of violence rather than the legality of it.
Vollmann builds his argument with the support of specific examples of violence to further clarify what he constitutes as moral and immoral decisions. Many of them involve a mother making a decision that could lead to the death of her child, such as the mother who was interrogated by being forced to listen to her child being tortured by officers of the state. She did not choose to save her child, likely asserting that the state is responsible for her child’s death by refusing to participate. A main point Vollmann tries to get across is that violence is often the result of intolerable circumstances that people are placed in, and the decision they make must be judged in full context of the situation. There will not always be a favorable choice in any given decision, and it is up to the individual to make the most moral decision regardless of consequences and horror of the circumstances, even if it is not their doing. A primary assertion throughout the work is that 1) “So-called involuntary attachments are not binding” and 2) “voluntary attachments may likewise be withdrawn at any time.” However, this seems to conflict with the statement at the beginning of the chapter that moral decisions to wage violence are contingent on the fact that an individual does not have allegiance to any collectivity or authority. If voluntary attachments can be rescinded whenever, how can an individual be exempted from the four essential decisions of violence based on their allegiance? Going off both of these assertions, every individual should be held to the same moral standards regardless of allegiances, especially voluntary ones, since they are “not binding” and can be “withdrawn.” Say,for example, a police officer is the very first responder to the scene of an active shooter. He could enter the building alone immediately under the great risk he will be killed by the gunman and a small chance he is able to save others from the shooter’s violence. Or, he could follow his department’s protocol that says he needs to wait for additional support to arrive. Because of a voluntary allegiance to authority, he decides to wait for backup and three more people are killed as a result. Did he make the right decision? According to Vollmann, he would have been justified in waiting based on his allegiance. But would a private citizen have had a moral obligation to enter the building and attempt to save his fellow citizens? I don’t know what the right answer is, but both the private citizen and the police officer should be held accountable to the exact same standards when determining “whether or not to violently defend someone else from violence.” This is because the police officer’s voluntary attachment to his department can “be withdrawn at any time.” While there are certainly some conflicting statements throughout the chapter, William Vollmann makes a lot of interesting points on the morality of violence with a myriad of examples from specific instances of it and from both ancient and modern philosophers. What he has set out to accomplish—to provide clarity on the morality of violence—is no easy task.
–CT