Continuing his discussion of violence in defense of authority, Vollmann begins by discussing the Constitution’s authority. Vollmann thinks that it can cut both ways. On one hand, the constitution can give President Lincoln the authority to use force to defend the Union. On the other hand, its structure can also be construed to justify the practice of slavery under the banner of states’ rights. The constitution itself, he holds is the document which can constrain authority, and render it legitimate through law. Slavery then, remains within the bounds of that legitimacy. In order to move forward, Vollmann writes, law must be flouted by a new revolutionary authority to bend the rules of society into proper shape. (II p 306-311) From there, the discussion goes to Sherman’s march, and describes Lincoln’s logic for the defense of the Union. Then, in a blinding twist of fate, Vollmann sides with the south, stating that since the slave states didn’t vote for Lincoln, his authority was imposed on them, rendering his authority illegitimate ( II p 311). I had to do a double take on that one, but Vollmann is happy to expand on his logic in the next section
From there, Vollmann outlines what he sees as the circumstances in which defense of a preexisting authority can be justified and when it is unjustified, and describes what he views as the instances where an authority is illegitimate. The descriptors are a secessionist’s dream. Authority cannot be defended unless it provides anyone who wishes to exit society with a peaceful means of secession. There is also a caveat included that authority must enrich its citizens, which of course would vindicate the lost cause, since it was previously established that slaves were not considered sovereign citizens, and by outlawing the practice, the government would certainly have detracted from the wealth of the slave owning class (II p. 312-313). It strikes me that there is not a lot of room for a stable functioning government within the guidelines, but maybe I’m just a little more authoritarian, and don’t think that government should allow secession for anyone who feels slighted. Taken to its logical libertarian extreme, Vollmann’s argument can be used to justify secession for almost any regulation on commerce. It’s my opinion that such a set of commandments cannot be used for a functioning society.
The issue of slavery, Vollmann likes to consider separately from the issue of secession. He acknowledges that the secession of the South was for the protection of the slave authority, and roundly condemns this dark version of capitalism, but still holds that Lincoln was wrong to prevent secession. Then he goes on to stay that the outcome of the situation was the best: the destruction of slavery in the United States. However, this begs the predictable consequentialist question. If the best outcome was brought about by a deviation from his moral calculus, why is his calculus correct? (II p. 313-318) In spite of this over the next few pages, he continues to paint Lincoln as illegitimate in his authority, describing the fight to preserve the Union as nothing more than an aggrandizement of the authority itself, even comparing Lincoln’s authority to that of Napoleon at one point (II p. 319-329)
From there, we move naturally to Chapter 11, and Vollmann’s discussion of violence in defense of Race and Culture. He starts off by praising John Brown as a true revolutionary and a moral leader. In this section, Vollmann discusses Kansas, and the cycle of violence which engulfs the state as the pro and antislavery factions duke it out. He arrives at the conclusion that John Brown was indeed a murderer and a terrorist, but that his violence was justified (II p. 343-359).
Then Vollmann speaks on the topics of race and culture more broadly, musing on the fact that these institutions create feelings of kinship and solidarity which can, if left unchecked lead towards a tendency for violent domination of the outgroup. His solution is simply to check these impulses. The conclusion he comes to is, in his words, defense of race becomes illegitimate when it sees difference as inferior (II p. 360-363).
-M.H.