A Summary and Analysis of Vollmann’s Calculus on Violent Defense of Race/Culture and Creed
In this section Vollmann begins by discussing the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and his assassin James Earl Ray. Vollmann states that Ray accomplished both his ends and means. The means are the death of Martin Luther King Jr. and the ends are the perpetuation of a race war. “The immediate consequences of Martin Luther King’s assassination was large scale violence.” Twenty-six hundred people were injured and forty-six died, property damages reached $45 million, and the government called in the Eighty-Second Airborne division to restore order. He furthers this point by utilizing a powerful simile and asserting that “only anger endures, like the precipitate of a long and ugly chemical reaction.”
Ray rose up when he assassinated MLK and he rose down when he was forcibly retired from racial wars by being sent to prison. This interesting case study segues into Vollmann’s moral calculus on when violent defense of race and culture is justified/unjustified. I would now like to analyze one of the justifications that I find particularly well-thought out. First, violence is justified when “it is directed by a minority against a majority whose actions are causing imminent danger to the minority’s justified identity and expression.” Vollmann continues by adding several caveats saying that force is only allowable “when nonviolence has already failed and violence offers a very convincing probability of effectively achieving its stated result while obeying proportionality, discrimination and limit.” He ends by claiming that violence is justified “when individuals within the group toward which the violence is directed are implicitly and explicitly considered to have the same fundamental rights as those who carry out the violence.”
Vollmann then discusses defense of creed by using the example of Hernando Cortes’ conquest of Mexico under the guise of spreading Christianity. “Spaniards shove opposing creed-defenders aside, and smash the sacred thing. God… has been honored.” Vollmann then entertains an entire argument under the assumption that Cortes’ ends are “soul-salvation for all, and physical salvation for the sacrificial victims.” He does an entire balance sheet in which he tallies the loss of lives on both sides. I find this problematic for two reasons:
- Vollmann himself admits that this is just a hypothetical exercise and there are multiple confounding motivations behind Cortes’ conquest. Yet I think it is futile to even entertain these ideas when historians have a general consensus that his motivations boil down to three main things: God, Gold, and Glory. Why act like God is the only reason for Cortes’ brutality and grant him undeserved sympathy? Perhaps Vollmann merely wants to analyze a single variable (God), but when are humans’ motivations ever just one thing? Although harsh, I find myself more likely to accept Bakunin’s bold claim that “all religions are cruel; all founded on blood; for all rest principally upon the idea of sacrifice.” There is much that can be unpacked from that quote as well, but I will move on to my second point.
- Vollmann acknowledges that “the righteous side does not render itself unrighteous merely by killing more people than the unrighteous.” A digestible example of this is President Lincoln’s assassination, which killed only one person while the resulting judicial decision killed five. That does not mean that the execution is unjustified simply based on sheer numbers. Perhaps it is human nature to seek out data to explain what is right and wrong. This is something that we have discussed extensively in class. Is utilitarian calculus the best way to approach all moral decisions? I believe that Professor Carson would say no, although it is definitely an interesting metric to consider.
Vollmann furthers this argument of creed by analyzing the Biblical story of the Canaanite Mother. Essentially, a woman who is of a different creed from Christ begs him to heal her daughter. At first he tests her and then realizing that her faith is strong, he heals the daughter. The Old Testament of the Bible defends “the straight and narrow path of creed with a ruthless unilateralism.” The Old Testament contains many examples of this severity: slaughtering, razing, and enslaving. Vollmann argues that this mindset can be seen in the conquests of Cortes, the abolitionist actions of John Brown, and Stalin’s firing squad.
The New Testament contains deviations from this strict creed that are contingent upon repentance. Christ himself ignores the denunciations of the Pharisees and heals on the Sabbath. But to my understanding, this is what the New Testament is all about. Jews no longer need to keep Kosher and follow the strict rules of the Old Testament; all that is required for salvation is faith. An insight that I find particularly interesting is Vollmann’s assertion that perhaps the meeting of the Canaanite woman was “as much of a turning point for him as it was for her.” I have heard much discussion about Christ’s impact, but few have discussed others’ impact on Christ. Vollmann corroborates this claim by stating that the parable of the good Samaritan came after this meeting. Coincidence? Vollmann thinks not.
Vollmann then decides to discuss the difference between a creed and an end: a creed’s achievement is not necessarily measurable. Faith abandons traditional norms and requires that we rise up (or down) towards the unknown with care towards the wind. Essentially, “faith equals extremism.” Vollmann then names several historical figures with similar levels of faith and descending levels of goodness: “Christ-Gandhi-Joan-Napoleon-Cortes-Lenin-Hitler.” One aspect of a creed is that it must be universal: “we defend our faith by extending it everywhere, pulling down idols and bayoneting capitalists as we go.” There is little to no room left for compromise.
Vollmann ends this volume by discussing when violent defense of creed is justified/unjustified. I would now like to analyze one of the justifications that I take issue with: the idea that defense of creed is allowed when it is morally transparent. But what exactly does transparency entail? Vollmann argues inclusiveness which can be discerned from context. I find this to be quite paradoxical: he is attempting to apply a rule that can be applied to most situations of violence yet in order to apply the rule one has to assess the situational context. So why bother making a rule for creeds which will need to be addressed on a case to case basis? “Context” seems like a cop-out to me. Are my opinions critical? Perhaps. Would William T. Vollmann want someone to argue against his ideas? I think it is likely. My ideas are coming from a desire to engage with the text and perhaps Vollmann himself.
-P.K.