Chapter 7
In the Judge’s Chair
Vollmann asserts that the remaining chapters of the first half will study justifications for violence, and the audience will metaphorically imagine themselves in the “judge’s seat” for judging cases of imminence and futurity. Vollmann offers an outline to excuse varying cases of violence around the world, pulling from temporal differentiations. From defense of revolution, race, honor, and class to revenge, retaliation and deterrence, Vollmann’s roadmap will take the reader on a journey to apply a moral calculus to instances of justifiable violence.
Justifications, Self Defense
Chapter 8: Defense of Honor
Vollmann remembers the gallant legacy of Captain Nolan, a British officer known for his role in the Charge of the Light Brigade. He then invokes the legacy of Bill Clinton, simply picking up the phone and calling in a missile strike. In this juxtaposition, Nolan exemplified veritable valor as he charged into bayonets and cannons. How do we reconcile this showing with a more passive call to arms by Clinton?
Besides our physical bodies, there lives a moral, mental, and emotional being. Vollmann states the real aim of violence is to “conquer, direct, warn, mark, injure, suppress, and obliterate the consciousness within the body.” Taking this context into consideration, Vollmann defines honor as “the extent to which the self-approaches its own particular standard of replying to or initiating violence.” Often, honor is identified within the right of local norms. A revolutionary, a saint, and a military commander all perceive this honor in different ways. To simplify his inquiry, Vollmann partitions the concept of honor. Inner honor is unknowable to others. It is the degree “of harmony between an individual’s aspirations, deeds, and voluntary or involuntary experiences.” Outer honor is the degree “of esteem which someone is held.” It derives from status or the alignment between his professed aspirations and known deeds. Vollmann states that honor can also be cross-divided into individual and collective. Outer collective honor comprises a group’s official face and presence, while inner collective honor is the degree of adherence to the ideals it professes.
In urban cultures, the social contract is more formalized and systematic; inner honor declines to illegitimacy. Likewise, outer honor slips out of the individual agency. Vollmann outlines the Shepherd Maxim: as authority enlarges itself, its obligation to protect from violence the individual it controls increases. The ability of those individuals to defend themselves decreases. Kindness proposes a different maxim: honor should not be derived from standards in which we cannot control. Vollmann discusses different honor interpretations of rape. In some cultures, women are blamed for the violence against them. They are victims of dishonor. For example, in Afghanistan, a rapist destroys not only the woman but her family as well. The girl may be killed to preserve the remaining moral body of the family. Violence involving women is not limited to Eastern cultures; young unwed mothers may commit infanticide to defend her outer honor. Outer honor is determined by the purity of another purview. Inner honor can be easily swayed by this outer honor. As Vollmann notes, outer honor gives security, helping one to solidify a secure, standard role in society. Honor can wipe away doubt, such as committing suicide before a surrender. Vollmann comments on the honor of Adolf Eichmann, an engineer of the Holocaust. Vollmann marks Eichmann high in all aspects of honor, both inner and outer. There are two kinds of honor: pride and fame. To Vollmann, we are not entitled to judge another self until their expression sets out to achieve a purpose.
There are ways to don public honor in uniforms, garments, or monuments. In this discussion, Vollmann compares outer honor to a molecule that can be divided into ethical electrons. Vollmann further divides the concept into its subdivisions: class, status, prestige, and popularity. Class is an objective measure of one’s position in society, status is an objective measure of one’s relative allocation of power and resources, prestige is the union between status and outer honor, and popularity is a quantifiable measure of how much one is liked. Next Vollmann displays his induction table on his presumed motivations associated with a violent defense of honor. Among the list are famous episodes including Joan of Arc’s suicidal refusal to recant and Japanese kamikazes. He classifies each instance with its motivation, the type of honor it concerns and differentiates its mean and ends. Vollmann’s grand inductive conclusion is that “no act ever in and of itself be an end of outer honor, only a means.”
Collective honor can never give rise to deeds which are ends in and of themselves. An exception is an aestheticism. Vollmann reflects on Napoleon’s Arc de Triomphe. As a reification, the monument personifies Napoleon’s honorable conquests. The defense of collective honor provides a tool of practical, predictable utility for social engineers looking to capitalize on genus identification to strengthen a social organism, like an army. However, the violent defense of collective honor cannot be justified when the justification is just honor itself, and there is no threat of physical harm.
Vollmann asserts he does not believe collective honor is solely an artifact instilled by superior manipulators. We may be lured into making promises against our innate interests with the manipulation of collective honor, but honor will work toward common long-term interests. We fight this trend when there is a justified defense, and it is moral to establish the spirit of the group. Vollmann considers Joan of Arc a prime exemplifier of honor. She is graded with high marks in all aspects of honor, excluding outer honor from the English perspective where her unfeminine rebellion portrays her as diabolical. While acknowledging her political naivety, her pious and honest standards to the Lord requite admiration.
In determining the ends for which honor is invoked, Vollmann outlines the following: leadership ends invoke honor for the sake of control, emotional ends invoke honor in order to guard or increase satisfaction, ethical ends preserve honor in order to preserve of achieving justice, and expedient ends invoke honor in order to gain or protect something.
Vollmann then discusses the honor of Napoleon. He claims Napoleon conducted himself in an honorable manner, showing sympathy to and taking responsibility for his fallen soldiers. He personified martial ardor, concurrently letting the revolution control their own representation. Napoleon prioritized was glory and honor of arms, and then the preservation of his men. Vollmann acknowledges his character flaws, but serves praise for his figure. He argues Napoleonic honor lies between ethics and pure aesthetics. He was gallant, ruthless, and possessed a measure of intrinsic honor For example, he didn’t torture his own citizens. In artistic depictions, Napoleon is preserved as a dynamic, commanding figure. His collective honor was rewarding and expedient in his successful military campaigns. Napoleon was a popular despot.
Next, Vollmann discusses Dwight Edgar Abbot at a California Youth School. The toughest “Straights” degrade and rape the “punks” to destroy the vestiges of their masculinity. Vollmann says the one common excuse for violence is the inevitability. In the Abbot case, Abbot slashes another inmate’s throat who attacked him. Vollmann explores if Abbot had a choice. If he refrained from retaliation, he would’ve been free. However, Abbot was a literal prisoner of his honor and sacrificed his freedom to defend his reputation.
Vollmann touches on characters like King Olaf from Norse mythology, and Sun-Tzu. Olaf fought defensive battles for the sake of his stays, and Sun-Tzu vanity explains instances of violent outbursts. However, it is that both men must defend their honor more vigorously or else he will lose his status to another who can represent honor better.
To Vollmann, honor comprises means as well as the end. Violent defense of honor is justified when honor is altruistic, the defense of honor corresponds with other justified defense, or if the defender’s peers agree that dishonor is equivalent to physical death. Violent defense of honor is not justified when it is a defense of collective honor alone, it is against a nonviolent victim, or linked to another end. To end, Vollmann discusses Chairman Mao’s personal Doctor, Li Zhisui. Dr. Li admits his dishonor, as he was passive in Mao’s murderous programs. He acted as “Mao’s lapdog” acquiescing his collective honor to gain favor with the leader. He lived shamefully while millions starved. In contrast, a woman named Nien Cheng refused to submit to Mao. She was willing to submit her body to continued violence for the sake of her mortal body. Vollmann admires her inner honor. Dr. Li failed to rationalize how his service by in large helped destroy millions of lives as he cared for Mao.
A.A.